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Abstract 
There has been a tendency in Gower scholarship to emphasize what Genius 
is not doing in the Confessio Amantis: the stories he does not tell, the sins he 
fails to discuss, and the interpretations he does not pursue. Some critics view 
Genius’s supposed deficiencies as intentional failings designed by Gower to 
challenge his readers; still, these readings are centered on absence rather than 
presence. This paper offers a new interpretation of Genius’s role in 
the Confessio, and, in particular, of Genius’s use of classical exempla, by 
arguing that the absence of allegorized versions of these tales is, in fact, the 
result of a conscious decision to use an alternate method of reading —ethical 
reading— rather than allegorical interpretation. Instead of merely 
appropriating or desecularizing “old bokes,” the process of ethical reading 
preserves the status of secular texts while reframing them to make them 
morally useful for new generations of readers. 
Keywords: John Gower, medieval literature, medieval education, Ovid, 
readers, classical reception, medieval hermeneutics. 
 
Genius begins his confession in Book I of Gower’s Confessio Amantis with 
a prefatory lecture on the five senses and the dangers of suggestion. The first 
few exempla –those of Acteon, Medusa, the asp, and Ulysses– serve to narrow 
the topic of discussion to just two of those senses, leaving Genius with one 
simple lesson: Amans must learn how to “kepe and warde” (CA I.331) his eyes 
and ears, even to keep them locked up if necessary, to protect himself from 
foolish suggestions.1 If Amans can learn to govern his eyes and ears, he will 
have no problem governing the other senses. They are that fundamental. 
In addition to teaching Amans this important lesson, Genius’s discussion 
on the senses functions as an introduction to the entire confession because he 
uses three of the major sources for the exempla in the Confessio —Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, the Bible, and Trojan history— to provide four stories that 
    
1 All references to the Confessio Amantis are from Macaulay (1899-1902). 
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acquaint Amans (and the reader) with many of the topics that will be found in 
the first book, and indeed, throughout the whole of the text, such as pride, 
consent, self-governance, judgment, and wisdom. To counteract any potential 
confusion that might arise due to the broad scope of topics introduced here, 
Genius restates his primary lesson every chance he can. For example, he begins 
his version of the tale of Acteon with a couplet that plainly states both the 
source and the moral of the story: “Ovide telleth in his bok/Ensample touchende 
of mislok” (CA I.333-34). After the tale ends (less than fifty lines later), Genius 
transitions to the next example by telling Amans the moral again, “Lo now, my 
Sone, what it is/A man to caste his yheamis” (CA I.379-80), and citing Ovid as 
the source for his next story, which also teaches the dangers of “mislokynge” 
(CA I.445).  
From this brief overview, it should be clear that this prefatory section is (or 
at least appears to be) a straightforward introduction to the confession that 
follows. From the perspective of modern scholars, however, the four exempla 
contained in this section have often been seen as elusive, disadvantageous, 
misconstrued, or even, in the words of Farnham, “morally ridiculous” 
(1974:168). This is an important problem, one which significantly affects our 
understanding of the Confessio, and thus merits further discussion. 
The primary issue at stake here is how critics have responded to Gower’s 
omission of the allegorized versions of these tales. Hatton (1975), for example, 
armed with the writings of the church fathers and with Gower’s own Mirour de 
l’Omme, explains that Gower was familiar with the “spiritual” interpretations of 
the tale of the asp, even though the interpretations Genius provides are “carnal” 
(i.e. literal) ones. In Hatton’s reading, Genius, blind to the obvious allegorical 
possibilities of his own exempla, is actually “mistelling his tales to make them 
support the narrow literal points which he attempts to impress on Amans” 
(1975:33). Meanwhile, Gower, knowing his audience is more perceptive than 
Genius, “imbeds in the tales clues that Genius overlooks which suggest that his 
creator intends the reader to remember the spiritual significances that elude the 
Priest of Venus” (Hatton 1975:33). A similar argument is made by Olsson, who 
outlines the standard interpretations of the story of the asp in order to support 
this conclusion: “The point is not that the story lacks the potential for a gloss, 
but that it is open to multiple readings, and Genius rejects that wealth of 
significance” (1992:67). Olsson does not argue that Genius is “mistelling” the 
tale, just that Genius leaves out these allegorical readings, and that this rejection 
can be seen by the reader as Gower’s way of highlighting the similarities 
between Genius and the tales he tells:  
The story of the asp, as Genius himself tells it, illustrates by analogy that 
difference in his character as a genius. Readings in bono and in malo of 
serpent and charmer disappear in the narratio and its simple, incomplete 
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moralitas. Gower “centers” our attention on the telling, and as with the 
narrative, so with Genius: the poet provides no explicit readings of his 
persona; he “centers” him as a narrator, even as judge, giving us little 
opportunity to make a definitive judgment in bono or in malo. (1992:68) 
Olsson’s (1992) Genius is a “patron of too much” (56) a “personified 
demande” (146), an ingenious yet untrustworthy figure who destabilizes our 
reading and, in doing so, “encourages multiple and ultimately wiser responses 
to the poem” (52). Hatton’s Genius is a well-meaning yet ignorant servant of 
Venus, whose “doggedly literal handling of richly allegorical materials” 
(1975:36) demonstrates the limits of carnal understanding and the dangers of 
concupiscence. 
What both critical readings share, aside from a grounding in allegorized 
versions of the story of the asp, is a concern with the potential story as 
understood by Gower’s readers as opposed to the actual story as told by Genius 
to Amans. Both readings take as their starting point the expectations of Gower’s 
readers, and from there, they make judgments as to the success of Genius’s 
interpretations. One would not want to downplay the significance of discussing 
the interpretive potential of Genius’s stories, or entirely disagree with Mitchell 
and others who maintain that “in the strongest sense the poem remains to be 
invented through reader response” (2004:52).2 However, it does appear that 
Genius’s reputation has been unfairly damaged by arguments that focus more 
on what Genius is not doing than on what he is doing. Instead of insisting that 
the omission of allegorical readings is a failure on Gower’s part, or that it is 
nothing more than a blatant invitation for the reader to supply these readings, 
we should consider the possibility that Gower avoided allegorical readings for 
another reason entirely, one which has implications not just outside the fiction 
of the text but within that fiction as well. We should consider that there was 
another method of interpretation available to Gower, and that this other method 
supported his didactic intentions in a way that allegory could not. 
The method of interpretation that Genius practices is not allegorical 
interpretation but ethical reading. Developed in medieval grammar schools as a 
way of justifying the use of imaginative literature in the classroom, ethical 
reading challenges readers to view this literature as a source of practical 
wisdom, even if that wisdom is not always apparent on the surface of the text.3 
    
2 See also Hiscoe (1985) and Simpson (1995). 
3 Medieval educators did not actually use the phrase “ethical reading,” nor did they routinely 
acknowledge the existence of this category. However, there is much to be gained from the 
introduction of a well-defined concept of “ethical reading” into our scholarly discourse —a 
concept derived from the medieval perception of the educative function of literature and 
from the interpretive methodologies developed in order to understand that function. Previous 
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The difference between ethical reading and allegorical interpretation is evident 
in Kaster’s comparison of Basil (who recommends what could be called ethical 
reading, although Kaster does not use that term) and Augustine (who advocates 
allegorical interpretation):  
Basil assumes that the literary culture would remain a sanitized but 
unmistakably secular propaedeutic: as the first step toward the final good of 
the soul, Moses’ preliminary gymnastics among the Egyptians have a value 
in themselves and are left, so to speak, in situ. But when Augustine speaks of 
the use of the foreign culture, in the metaphor of despoiling the Egyptians, 
the emphasis is wholly on passing out of Egypt. The bits and pieces of the 
literary culture that one can surreptitiously appropriate are valued only to the 
extent that they do not remain secular; the metaphor of propaedeutic, with its 
implications of continuity and progress, yields before the metaphor of 
possessive alienation. (1997:87-88) 
Kaster is discussing the interpretation of secular texts, since they were the 
primary targets of Augustine’s method of reinterpretation, but the distinction 
between ethical and allegorical reading can be relevant for the study of religious 
texts as well, especially if they are placed alongside secular texts and used as 
exempla (as they are in Gower).   
We can recognize the difference between ethical reading and allegorical 
interpretation as it relates to the tales in Gower’s Confessio if we compare, on 
the one hand, Genius’s own interpretation of the Acteon story, which he tells as 
an exemplum about a man who “caste his yheamis” (CA I.380), and, on the 
other hand, the interpretation proposed by Wetherbee, for whom “the 
vulnerability of the young hunter’s senses to the sight of the nude goddess is a 
synecdoche for the nature of fallen man” (1991:28). Both are perfectly valid 
interpretations, but the method of ethical reading that Genius uses has the 
advantage of preserving the integrity of the literary text while still opening the 
text up to a discussion of ethical issues. Rather than composing an allegorical 
    
discussions of ethics and medieval interpretation have provided useful insight on the 
significance of the ethical approach to literature, but to do so, they have often had to sacrifice 
specificity and context. Thus, we find such generalizing statements as Allen’s “to define 
ethics in medieval terms is to define poetry, and to define poetry is to define ethics” 
(1982:12) and Dagenais’s substitution of “ethical reading” for “medieval reading” (1984:8). 
It is true that the broad influence of ethics in medieval literary culture deserves further study, 
but to argue that medieval poetry and hermeneutics are inherently ethical is overstating the 
case. Obviously, a full discussion of ethical reading is beyond the scope of this essay. The 
goal here is simply to examine the relevance of ethical reading to Gower studies, in the hope 
of directing our attention to this gap in the scholarship on medieval education and 
hermeneutics, and to the importance of those fields of study for our understanding of literate 
(i.e., Latin educated) authors such as John Gower. 
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reinterpretation of the text that might suit his purposes, Genius merely has to 
enclose the text in a moral framework and then subtly excerpt or amend the text 
so that it can plausibly function as an example of the topic under discussion. In 
ethical reading, therefore, the text can be just as important as the moral, whereas 
in allegorical reading, the focus is on the interpretation, and the original text is 
rendered virtually irrelevant (a fact which might explain why critics have been 
so hesitant to accept non-allegorical readings of texts that have already been 
despoiled).  
In order to understand Genius’s use of ethical reading and the advantage he 
gains from practicing it, this essay will focus on two examples that are often 
featured in discussions of Genius’s “misreading”: the tale of Phebus and 
Daphne (Book III), and the tale of Ceyx and Alcyone (Book IV). Before 
discussing those tales, however, it will be useful to turn away from Gower for a 
moment and look at the evidence for this type of reading in the medieval 
commentary tradition. The context here is highly significant. Ethical reading is, 
first and foremost, a product of medieval pedagogy, and as such, it functions by 
cultivating a certain type of relationship between texts and readers that is 
particularly suited to a pedagogical setting. 
A rich source of information about literary culture in the Middle Ages, and, 
in particular, about the ways in which classical texts were interpreted is to be 
found in the accessus ad auctores [introductions to authors], brief prefatory 
documents that often circulated along with the commentaries on authoritative 
texts like Ovid’s Metamorphoses to provide an overview of the text and its 
author.4 In general, the content of these accessus involved literary topics such as 
the life of the author, the structure of the work, and the author’s intention in 
composing the work, but in the twelfth century specifically, a type of accessus 
emerged that asked –in addition to the standard literary questions– “cui parti 
philosophia es upponitur” (“to which part of philosophy does it belong”). The 
most common response –unsurprising, given that literature provides abundant 
examples of human behavior– was “ethica es upponitur” (“it belongs to 
ethics”).5 Obviously, the mere mention of ethics in an accessus does not in itself 
    
4 On the accessus ad auctores, see Huygens (1970), Hunt (1980), Allen (1982:5-10), Minnis 
(1984), and Quain (1986), 
5 For example, in the collection of accessus edited by Huygens (1970), seventeen out of the 
twenty-seven texts introduced are classified under ethics. Of the remaining ten, five are 
described without any mention of philosophy (or, in one case, with no response to the 
question of philosophical classification, even though it is mentioned at the outset of the 
accessus), one is classified under physicae (physical science), one is classified under logicae 
(logic), and three have a double classification (in the accessus to Horace’s Arspoetica, for 
example, the commentator mentions that the text could be classified under ethics or logic). 
The practice of classifying texts under the parts of philosophy betrays the origins of this 
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constitute an ethical reading. Some commentators simply insert the phrase 
“ethica es upponitur” into their accessus without any further explanation, and 
others use it merely to provide a general definition of ethics. But these are not 
the only methods employed by commentators to align their texts with moral 
instruction, and ethica es upponitur is not the only part of these accessus that 
determines the ethical potential of the text that follows.   
Consider, for example, the way in which one commentator uses ethics and 
utility to provide a unified statement about the moral content of Ovid’s 
Heroides: 
Ethicae subiacet quia bonorum morum est instructor, malorum vero 
exstirpator. Finalis causa talis est, ut visa utilitate quae ex legitimo procedit et 
infortuniis quae ex stulto et illicito solent prosequi, hunc utrumque fugiamus 
et soli casto adhereamus. (Huygens 1970:30)6 
The general importance of Heroides accessus for the study of Gower’s 
Confessio has been established by Minnis, who explains that “Gower’s exempla 
amantium are patterned in a way which is basically similar to what mediaeval 
commentators regarded as the Heroides-paradigm, where exempla of legal 
lovers are juxtaposed with exempla of foolish lovers and unchaste lovers” 
(1980:208).7 It is true that Gower could have been influenced by the paradigms 
    
particular type of accessus, which was initially used for introductions to philosophical texts. 
The overwhelming emphasis on ethics, however, speaks to a larger discussion about the 
value of imaginative literature and the moral responsibilities of grammar instructors. Irvine 
addresses this topic in his discussion of late antique commentaries on Virgil: “Vergil’s 
works, and other canonical writers, became the core of an ethically and ideologically 
centered literary education. The commentaries provoke important questions about 
canonicity, literariness, and the nature of literature itself as an institutional formation, 
questions which serve to distance the modern from the medieval era. The classification of 
poetry under the ethical division of philosophy in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries 
simply made explicit what was presupposed in earlier medieval grammatica” (1994:161). 
6 “The work pertains to ethics, because [Ovid] is teaching good morality and eradicating evil 
behaviour. The ultimate end of the work is this, that, having seen the advantage gained from 
lawful love, we may shun both of these and may adhere to chaste love” (Minnis and Scott 
1991:20-21). As Hexter (1986:158) points out, the subject of the “quia” clause in the first 
line is ambiguous. The translation quoted above reads “because he is teaching” (my 
emphasis). For clarity’s sake, this has been changed to “because [Ovid] is teaching,” but it is 
certainly possible that it could be Ovid’s work (the Heroides) that is being referred to rather 
than Ovid himself. This slight ambiguity, however, does not affect my argument. What is 
significant here is that this commentator strengthens the force of “ethica es ubiacet” at the 
beginning of this passage by adding an explicit statement about Ovid (or his work) teaching 
us ethics, and by following that statement with an explanation of the work’s utility that 
pushes the ethical responsibility of the text onto the reader. 
7 See also Minnis (1983:57-58). 
GENIUS AND THE PRACTICE OF ETHICAL READING 
ES. Revista de Filología Inglesa 33.1 (2012) 
143
familiar to him from commentaries on the Heroides, as Minnis argues, but we 
may nonetheless come up short if we use this line of influence to look for 
deeper connections between the reading methods presented in these accessus 
and the methods used by Genius in the Confessio. The particular Heroides 
accessus that Minnis (1980:208) uses to introduce his argument, for example, 
has very little to say on the subject of ethics: “Etices ubponitur quia agit de 
moribus.”8 The accessus cited above, however, is quite explicit about the ethical 
potential of Ovid’s text. Taking us beyond paradigms and general definitions of 
ethics, this commentator suggests that the Heroides can be classified under 
ethics not merely because we can learn about ethics from the text, but because 
Ovid is teaching us ethics. In this accessus, both the author and the audience are 
given new roles: Ovid becomes an instructor of ethics, and the readers become 
his students. The explanation of Ovid’s finalis causa pushes this interpretation 
even further, using first-person plural verbs such as fugiamus and adhereamus 
to direct the ethical force of Ovid’s instruction towards the reader, who is 
expected to live up to the ethical and hermeneutic challenges outlined in the 
accessus. By adapting the conventional rhetoric of the accessus to his needs, 
this commentator has strengthened the didactic potential of the text and laid the 
groundwork for a lesson in active reading.  
Another example of ethical reading, this time from outside the realm of 
exempla amantium, can be found in the accessus to a commentary, written by 
Arnulf of Orléans, on Lucan’s Bellum Civile (known to the Middle Ages as the 
Pharsalia). Arnulf’s accessus is extensive, and includes a vita of Lucan as well 
as a full summary of the historical events behind Lucan’s poem. Near the 
beginning of this accessus, Arnulf provides an ethical utilitas, followed by a 
clear description of the moral content readers should expect to find in the 
Bellum Civile: 
Vtilitas magna quia, uiso quid contingeri tutrique de ciuilibello, uidelicetet 
Pompeio capite truncari, Caesari XX et IIII plagis in Capitolio perforari, 
caueamus nobis a bello consimili. Ethices upponitur, non ideo quod 
detpreceptamorum, sed quodam modo inuitat nosad IIII uirtutes, 
fortitudinem, prudenciam, temperanciam, iusticiam, per conuenientes 
personas, ostenden dobonam moralitatem sicut in Catoneet in ceteris bonis 
ciuibus qui ad politicas uirtutes ni tunturque ethices upponuntur. (Marti 
1958:3)9 
    
8 “[The work] pertains to ethics because it deals with behavior” (my translation). 
9 “The [work’s] usefulness is great because, when it is seen what happened to each of the 
protagonists as a result of the civil war, that is, that Pompey had his head cut off and Caesar 
was transfixed by twenty-four wounds on the Capitol, we may steer clear of any similar war. 
It pertains to ethics not because he gives moral instruction but because in a certain way he 
encourages us to practice the four virtues, courage, wisdom, self-control, and justice, by 
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Arnulf’s graphic account of the results of the war echoes the graphic 
language of Lucan’s poem, gives the reader a preview of the monitory 
exemplum contained within the text, and pushes the ethical content towards the 
reader with the first-person plural caueamus nobis. But unless Arnulf were 
instructing future kings, his political lesson alone might not carry the weight 
necessary to teach students the function of exemplary tales. His extended 
discussion of ethicaes upponitur, with its explicit move from didactic rhetoric 
(det precepta morum) to exhortative rhetoric (inuitat nos ad IIII uirtutes), its list 
of virtues, and its reference to virtuous Cato, provides an entirely new 
framework for the epic as a narrative about exemplary virtue. 
Ovid’s Heroides and Lucan’s Bellum Civile do not, on the literal level, 
offer the same type of experience for the reader. But through ethical reading –a 
method of reading that explicitly guides the reader towards the ethical and 
didactic content of the text– both texts are made to serve an exemplary function, 
teaching their readers about the intricacies of practical ethics. It is important to 
recognize, of course, that these examples of ethical reading are derived from the 
prefatory material appended to commentaries, and not from the commentaries 
themselves, which are unquestionably geared towards linguistic (as opposed to 
ethical) instruction. The absence of ethics in these commentaries has led some 
scholars to question the significance of all ethical claims made in the accessus 
ad auctores. For example, Black writes: “Moralizing accessus were an ideal 
way to pay lip-service to the moralistic aims of education, which teachers felt 
under no obligation to make into a reality in the classroom” (2001:315).10 There 
is, however, another way to view the relationship between philological 
commentaries and their ethical accessus, as Gillespie suggests:  
The broad and common taxonomy of literary analysis found in most medieval 
accessus encoded a way of thinking about a text (and not just the one under 
immediate study) that was transferable to other texts and contexts. The literary 
prospectus provided by such introductions usually offers a more reflective and 
theoretical perspective on the text under discussion and on its relationship to the 
metatextual and archetypal literary issues of intention, utility and philosophical 
orientation. The accessus was a means of placing a text in the literary continuum of 
history, in the narrative continuum of an author’s work, or in the ethical and 
hermeneutic continuum of the textual community of its original and medieval 
readers. It taught a way of looking at and thinking about literature that was 
formative as well as summative. In other words, it sought to create the taste by 
which it was to be appreciated. (2005:146-47) 
    
means of appropriate characters, showing us good morality as in the case of Cato and other 
citizens who strive after those virtues in the state which pertain to ethics” (Minnis and Scott 
1991:155).  
10 See also Hexter (1986:212). 
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Gillespie’s assessment resolves what he refers to as “the disjunction 
between accessus and commentary” by underlining their differences. If we read 
commentaries expecting to find accessus categories, we will be disappointed, 
but we should not take that as a sign that the accessus were quickly abandoned 
once the commentary began. The significance of the accessus lies in the moral 
framework it establishes for further interpretations of the text, and in the 
theoretical model it provides for future study.   
In the commentary on the Aeneid attributed to Bernardus Silvestris 
(henceforth “(Pseudo-)Bernardus”), we can find yet another example of ethical 
reading, this time paired with an allegorical interpretation of the same text. 
(Pseudo-)Bernardus tells us, in the preface to his commentary, that Virgil is 
both a poet and a philosopher, and that readers must keep this “double teaching” 
(gemine doctrine) in mind as they read the text.11 The ethical reading of Virgil’s 
Aeneid is located in the discussion of “Virgil the poet,” under the heading cur 
agat (i.e., what the accessus writers refer to as utilitas or finalis causa). 
(Pseudo-)Bernardus tells his readers that one of the lessons they will find in 
Virgil’s text is “recte agenda prudential que capitur exemplorum exhortatione” 
(“knowledge of how to act properly, acquired from the exhortation imparted to 
us by the examples”; l. 20-21). He continues: 
Verbi gratia: ex laboribus Enee tolerantie exemplum habemus, ex affectu eius 
in Anchisem at Ascanium pietatis, ex veneratione quam diis exibebat et ex 
oraculis que poscebat, ex sacrificiis que offerebat, ex votis et precibus quas 
fundebat quodammodo ad religionem invitamur. Per immoderatum Didonis 
amoremab appetitu illicitorum revocamur. (Jones and Jones 1977:1-3l n. 21-
24)12   
    
11 The attribution of this commentary to Bernardus Silvestris has largely been discarded, but 
scholars are hesitant to remove his name from the title because the commentary is still tied to 
him in the scholarship and because the unknown author seems to have been writing during 
the same time period and within the same intellectual schools that we associate with 
Bernardus Silvestris. The name “(Pseudo-) Bernardus” has been adopted from Ziolkowski 
and Putnam (2008). For a discussion of the authorship issue, see Jeauneau (1964:821-65), 
Stock (1972:36-37), Baswell (1985:199-221), and Wetherbee (2005:135). For further 
discussion on the commentary itself, see Wetherbee (1972:104-11), Copeland (1991:80-86), 
and Baswell (1995:91-130). 
12 “For instance, the trials of Aeneas give us an example of endurance; the love he showed 
towards Anchises and Ascanius an example of steadfast loyalty; the reverence he displayed 
towards the gods, his seeking out of oracles, the sacrifices he offered, and the prayers and 
vows he poured out attract us in a certain way towards religious observance. The excessive 
love of Aeneas for Dido restrains us from the desire for what is unlawful” (Minnis and Scott 
1991:150-53). All further English translations of (Pseudo-)Bernardus are taken from this 
edition. 
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As with the readings of Ovid’s Heroides and Lucan’s Bellum Civile 
discussed above, ethical reading turns the text –in this case, Virgil’s Aeneid– 
into a collection of exemplary tales, according to which particular sections of 
the text can be pulled out and assigned relevant Christian virtues. Here, again, 
we have a discussion of the moral content of the work, complete with the use of 
first-person plural verbs, which effectively push the ethical potential of the text 
towards the reader and exhort him to follow the examples Virgil has provided 
for the reader’s benefit. 
(Pseudo-)Bernardus departs from the accessus writers, however, when he 
moves from his discussion of “Virgil the poet” to his discussion of “Virgil the 
philosopher.” It is here that we are given a preview of the allegorical 
interpretation that becomes the primary focus of (Pseudo-)Bernardus’s 
commentary:   
Scribit ergo in quantum est philosophus humane vite naturam. Modus 
agendita lisest: in integumento describit quid agatvel quid paciatur humanus 
spiritus in humano corpora temporaliter positus. […] Integumen tumest genus 
demonstrationis sub fabulosa narration veritatis involvens intellectum, unde 
etiam dicitur involucrum. Utilitatem verocapit homo ex hoc opera, scilicet sui 
cognitionem. (ll. 29-37)13   
The difference between ethical reading and allegorical interpretation 
represented here is one of content as well as depth. The reader focused on 
“Virgil the poet” reaches just below the surface of the text in his search for 
practical moral exempla, while the reader in search of “Virgil the philosopher” 
plunges deeper into the text in pursuit of spiritual and philosophical truths, and, 
ultimately, self-knowledge.  
The commentary that follows this preface is an allegorical one, but for our 
purposes, what is significant is that (Pseudo-)Bernardus offers the ethical 
approach and the allegorical approach as separate, yet equally valid, methods 
for interpreting the text. A text as complex as Virgil’s Aeneid can support not 
only multiple readings but multiple types of readings (in the same way that the 
Bible can be read, for example, at both the tropological and the allegorical 
level). In other words, the existence of a long tradition of allegorical 
interpretations of Virgil’s text does not rule out the possibility of using the text 
for other purposes. 
    
13 “In so far as Virgil is a philosopher he describes the nature of human life. His mode of 
proceeding is as follows. In the integument he describes what the human spirit, placed for a 
period of time in the human body, does or suffers. […] The integument is a kind of teaching 
which wraps up the true meaning inside a fictitious narrative, and so is called ‘a veil.’ Man 
derives benefit from this work, the benefit being self-knowledge.” 
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The same can be said, of course, about Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Gower and 
his readers would have been aware of the allegorized versions of Ovid, but they 
would also have been aware of other interpretive methods such as ethical 
reading, which may have suited Gower’s didactic intentions in a way that 
allegorical interpretation could not. 
In Book III, Genius provides the tale of Phebus and Daphne as an example 
of “folhaste” (i.e. hastiness, rashness) and as a counterweight to the arguments 
against sloth in the next book. When read together, these stories teach the virtue 
of moderation. Yet neither Amans nor modern critics are content with Genius’s 
interpretation of this exemplum. For Amans, the tale cannot possibly apply to 
him, because, as he says, his lady is “No tre, but halt hire oghne forme” (CA 
III.1731). He reads the tale more literally than Genius tells it. The critics, 
however, have the opposite reaction –they are puzzled by the lack of allegory. 
Hatton (1989:270), for example, points out that the story is typically read as an 
exemplum about concupiscence and chastity. Harbert provides even more 
examples:  
The Ovide moralisé offers several explanations for the story of Apollo and 
Daphne, some pure rationalisations: the river Peneus has many laurels 
alongside it and the sun (Apollo) makes them grow, or Daphne was a girl 
who died fleeing her lover and was buried under a laurel-tree. Alternatively, 
Daphne is virginity fleeing corruption, changed into a laurel because it is 
evergreen and never bears fruit; or else Daphne is the Blessed Virgin, who 
was the laurel with which the Son of God crowned himself by taking up 
residence in her body. (1988:91) 
Although Genius hints at these interpretations by mentioning that the laurel 
tree is evergreen, and that Daphne will “duelle a maiden stille” (CA III.1719), 
his interpretation of the tale is far from allegorical.   
The advantage of ethical reading, for Genius, is that it allows him to 
maintain his focus on “folhaste,” while still leaving the tale open to further 
interpretation. He removes from the story any mention of the argument between 
Cupid and Phebus, which might have drawn our attention away from the main 
point of the exemplum. The fault here lies entirely with Phebus, who, by the 
time Cupid arrives on the scene, has already fallen in love with Daphne and has 
begun to pursue her tirelessly. Cupid has been reduced to an afterthought, 
whose darts serve only to confirm a preexisting love (as they did for Amans in 
I.143-47). And Daphne’s transformation, stripped of its etiological 
connotations, serves as both an echo of the original text and a quick way of 
ending the story so that Genius can proceed to the moral. The story may seem 
too unrealistic to be useful, but only if we are reading the tale literally, as 
Amans initially does. Genius responds to Amans’s literal interpretation by 
opening up the tale beyond the subject of love: 
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Mi Sone, sithen it is so,  
I seie no mor; bot in this cas 
Bewar how it with Phebus was. 
Noght only upon loves chance, 
Bot upon every governance 
Which falleth unto mannes dede, 
Folhaste is evere for to drede, 
And that a man good consail take, 
Er he his pourpos undertake, 
For consail put Folhaste aweie. (CA III.1736-45) 
Genius’s reading of this tale assigns it a moral significance beyond the 
particularities of the story, but it does not close the tale to further interpretation 
(as often happens in allegorical readings). Moreover, the moral Genius provides 
is not a normative prescription. He is not giving Amans strict rules to follow, 
but rather, offering him exemplary scenarios that highlight specific ethical 
issues. If Amans is going to find relief from his love, he must learn to read his 
own situation in terms of its broader ethical implications. Mitchell’s conclusion 
here is worth repeating: “The strength of the exemplum, alongside contrary 
cases, is that it invites the lover to reflect on the moral issues involved without 
legislating a course of action independent of personal reflection and the 
contingencies of his own cases” (2004:55). For Mitchell, however, Genius’s 
method of reading “is incomplete without the transition from text to meditation 
and action” (2004:17). He continues: “Until it is realized in the conscience or 
conduct of a practitioner as a form of life, exemplary morality exists only in 
potentia” (2004:17). It is true, of course, that the ethical utility of a text can only 
be realized in action. But Mitchell’s analysis runs the risk of taking us too far 
from the text. Within the text, Genius’s exempla serve only to provoke 
discussion on moral issues and to prompt Amans to dutifully request more 
exempla. 
For Amans (and the reader), the tale of Phebus and Daphne is a relatively 
easy lesson. Genius has given us Ovid’s tale, but simplified it to make it more 
useful as an exemplum on the vice of “folhaste” and related topics. The same 
cannot be said for the tale of Ceyx and Alcyone. And yet, Genius still has little 
use for allegorical interpretations. For this tale especially, they were abundant, 
and must have been difficult to avoid. Gower’s audience would have known 
two standard allegorical readings of the tale: a negative reading (such as that 
found in Giovanni del Virgilio’s Allegorie Librorum Ovidii Metamorphoses), in 
which the lovers represent cupidity, uxoriousness, spiritual sloth, and a concern 
for the pleasures of this world over those of the next; and a positive reading 
(such as that found in Pierre Bersuire’s Ovidius Moralizatus), where Alcyone 
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becomes the Christian soul, suffering the loss of Ceyx, who represents Christ.14 
Obviously, there is nothing to prevent that same audience from reading those 
interpretations into Gower’s text, even if Genius does not make them explicit. 
But the possibility of an allegorical reading does not mean that one is present in 
the text (if that were the case, then Virgil really would be a prophet). How, then, 
does Genius interpret this tale? 
The moral of this tale, for Genius, is twofold. Prompted by Amans’s 
remark that he has no use for sleep, Genius initially tells the tale as an 
exemplum on the utility of dreams. After stating this moral, however, Genius 
adds a cautionary note: “Bot slowthe no lif underfongeth/Which is to love 
appourtenant” (CA IV.3130-31). This second moral –that sloth and love are 
incompatible– ties the tale of Ceyx and Alcyone in with the rest of Book IV and 
initiates the discussion that will lead to the next tale, “The Prayer of Cephalus.” 
The first moral, on the utility of dreams, speaks to the larger issues of the text. 
Amans’s entire confession, we might recall, began with a dream-vision-like 
scenario, and the absence of any mention of Amans falling asleep hardly 
negates the strong parallels between dream-vision literature and Confessio as a 
whole. Even if the events narrated by Amans are not part of an actual dream, 
there can be no doubt that they are removed from Amans’s ordinary existence in 
some manner. By instructing Amans on the utility of dreams, Genius is looking 
ahead to Book VIII, when Amans (and the reader) will be expected to learn 
from these otherworldly encounters. Genius’s lesson also looks back to the 
opening lines of the Confessio (CA Prol.1-11), in which Gower praises the 
utility of old books and their role in the transmission of learning. Books, like 
dreams, are fictions that need to be interpreted before they can yield any sort of 
knowledge, and both are often dismissed as trivial, or, even worse, as harmful. 
Readers of the Confessio can benefit from Genius’s lesson on sloth and the 
utility of dreams, or they can bring their own ethical interpretation to the tale, 
because, as with Phebus and Daphne, Genius’s interpretations are not 
prescriptive but suggestive. He tells the tale in a way that would support his 
reading, but he also leaves numerous openings for further ethical inquiry. For 
example, if we want to read Alcyone in a wholly positive light, then we have to 
consider the idea that her impatience could be a virtue (or, at least, not a vice). 
Ceyx told Alcyone he would be gone two months, and “whan the Monthes were 
ago,/The whiche he sette of his comynge” (CA IV.2960-61), Alcyone 
immediately began praying for knowledge of her husband’s whereabouts. How 
do we reconcile this with Genius’s teachings on patience in Book III? Or, to 
take a closer example, can we draw a parallel between Alcyone and Phyllis? 
    
14 The allegorical readings of Ceyx and Alcyone are discussed in Hiscoe (1985:375-76) and 
Harbert (1988:91). 
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And how does that affect our reading of Ceyx if at all? Surely we cannot blame 
him for dying. But can we blame him for leaving? Genius certainly provides 
more explanation for Ceyx’s departure than he does for that of Aeneas (also in 
Book IV), but that does not mean the reasons for this departure are entirely clear 
either. We do not, for example, learn why his brother was turned into a goshawk, or 
why Ceyx has to travel to pray to the gods (especially since Alcyone prays quite 
successfully without leaving home). Genius gives us enough information to attempt 
our own interpretation of the text, but not enough to control the outcome of that 
interpretation. He tells the story of Ceyx and Alcyone in a way that highlights the 
ethical concepts being discussed at this point in the confession, the “horizon of 
possible outcomes,” in Mitchell’s (2004:59) terms, at the same time as it encourages 
an exploration of the other moral topics that can be found in the tale. 
The purpose of ethical reading, for the interpreter who chooses to practice 
this method, is that it enables the reader to derive moral content from even the 
most salacious texts, to “sanitize” the text, as Kaster says, while still keeping it 
intact. After learning to read in this manner, the student would most certainly be 
expected to apply these skills in ways that reach beyond the scope of the 
classroom. The ideal reader is one who can learn from the moral lessons that he 
finds in the texts, and who, in turn, will become a teacher himself (maybe not in 
the literal sense of the word, but in some way). As Gower himself says in his 
prologue, we are taught by old books, and therefore, we should compose our 
own books to leave for future generations. “Upon those who understand this 
essential character of books,” Yeager writes, “a certain implicit responsibility is 
conferred, to perpetuate the transmission of learning” (1981:41-42). The 
Confessio Amantis is Gower’s contribution to this learning process. Gower 
called upon the old stories and the reading methods that he would have been 
familiar with from his own schooling, and set them side by side with 
conventions drawn from the love literature of his own age, to produce a didactic 
text in which he (as Genius) teaches himself (as Amans) about the process of 
ethical reading and ethical judgment. 
Writing on Alan of Lille’s Anticlaudianus, Simpson argues that the “real 
meaning” of this poem –and of Gower’s Confessio– “is to be located not so 
much in its represented action as in the experience it provokes in its reader” 
(1995:203). If this is the case, then it might appear that the “real meaning” of 
the poem will forever elude our grasp. As Mitchell reminds us, 
Gower is the first ‘reader’ of his own text to open it up to complex and opposing 
responses. He says he writes in such a manner “Which may be wisdom to the 
wise/And pley to hem that lust to pleye” (CA Prol. 84-85*), even if it should seem 
palpable to us which response ‘moral’ Gower would prefer. (2004:41) 
The text encourages multiple (and often contradictory) responses, 
particularly among readers who know their Ovid, so to speak. Everything in the 
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Confessio has a history –from Genius and Amans to the stories drawn from 
pagan and Christian literature– and even if Gower does not always make use of 
those histories, he certainly makes no attempt to conceal them, since a large part 
of his project depends on the transfer of knowledge from authors to readers, and 
from teachers to students (or, to put it another way, from confessors to 
penitents). At the same time, we should recognize that “the experience it 
provokes in the reader” is “its represented action.” In other words, what the 
Confessio portrays is that same process of reading and learning that readers are 
expected to experience, particularly if you keep in mind Coleman’s (2002) 
argument that the “readers” of the Confessio may just as well have been 
“listeners.” Amans listens to Genius. He learns to read (i.e. interpret), and his 
understanding of each story is quite obviously influenced by his knowledge of 
the topic at hand and the way in which he applies the story to his own 
experience. In other words, since it is the very process of reading that is enacted 
in this poem, we might say that the experience provoked in the reader, which, 
for Simpson, constitutes the “real meaning” of the poem, is itself an important 
part of what Gower is doing in the Confessio, and is, therefore, situated as much 
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